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Abstract 
Major central banks have pointed out that basic economic models describe the 
monetary system inaccurately. In this context, the current paper presents a model of 
interest rate determination based on a sound description of the monetary system. Its 
novelty is providing an alternative credit supply function that represents planned 
savings. Further, the model is compared with three standard theories. The main 
conclusions are threefold. First, under certain assumptions, the viewpoint of loanable 
funds theory that the interest rate balances savings and investments can be reconciled 
with a monetary economy. However, the balancing process is not a market mechanism. 
Loanable funds theory must therefore be reinterpreted. Second, liquidity preference 
theory is insufficient to explain the interest rate level in a modern monetary economy. 
Third, endogenous money theory describes a monetary economy correctly in principle, 
but it is incomplete without the above-mentioned credit supply function. 
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1. Introduction 
As major central banks, such as the Bank of England (2014) and Bundesbank (2017), have 
pointed out, there are widespread misconceptions in economics about the monetary system—
even in undergraduate textbooks, unfortunately. The correct view is as follows. Banks do not 
‘lend out’ existing money but rather create new money by providing credit. Banks do not 
‘multiply up’ the amount of base money into the amount of broad money. The quantity of 
base money does not constrain the creation of broad money. Lending creates deposits, not 
vice versa. Finally, the central bank fixes the amounts of neither broad nor base money—it 
fixes the interest rate. To address these shortcomings, it is necessary to critically review 
existing models to analyze which insights are valid. Then, given that it is crucial to establish 
models that describe the monetary system accurately, researchers must decide which 
adjustments are necessary and which models must be abandoned. 
Based on the above discussion, this paper reviews the validity of standard economic 
models. For that reason, a model of interest rate determination that is based on a correct 
description of the monetary sector is presented and compared to different economic theories. 
The findings are as follows. Loanable funds theory must be reinterpreted. Although it 
is true that the interest rate balances planned savings and planned investment, this balancing 
process is not a market process. Instead, it is driven by central bank interventions. Liquidity 
preference theory alone is not sufficient to explain the interest rate level in the economy. 
Endogenous money theory describes monetary economies correctly in principle, but it lacks a 
central feature of money being not only created but also destroyed. A crucial insight for 
policymakers is that expansionary fiscal policy crowds out private investment in normal 
times but not when the interest rate is at its lower bound.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model of 
interest rate determination based on a sound understanding of monetary economies. Section 3 
shows how the model is related to loanable funds theory, liquidity preference theory, and 
endogenous money theory. Section 4 introduces a detailed monetary system into the model to 
incorporate all the initially mentioned facts about monetary systems. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
In this section, I present a simple approach to correctly model a monetary economy. In 
addition to its many standard and simplifying assumptions, the model has two important 
characteristics: a central bank that sets the interest rate endogenously depending on aggregate 
demand and an alternative credit supply function that is the amount that the public, as 
opposed to banks, is willing to lend. 
Time is divided into periods of equal length. Banks are open only at the beginning of 
a period. Credit contracts can only be closed when banks are open with lending terms of one 
period. At the beginning of the following period, all credit contracts are renegotiated. No 
money remains in circulation from previous periods, and all money is cash. The model has 
four elements: credit demand, credit supply, private banks, and a central bank. 
Credit demand: Cr D is the amount that the public wishes to borrow from the banks. It 
depends negatively on the interest rate, i, charged for borrowing because more investment 
projects are profitable at a lower interest rate. The demanders borrow the preferred amount of 
money from the private banks at the beginning of the period and spend it. The money then 
circulates unless brought to a bank as funds to be placed. 
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Credit supply: Lindner (2015) shows that the usual definition of the credit supply, namely, 
the amount of credit that banks are willing to grant, is not useful for measuring the amount of 
planned savings. A bank’s decision to provide credit is independent of the public’s savings 
decisions in a monetary economy. To connect savings and investments through the credit 
market, the credit supply, Cr S, is defined as the amount of money that the public is willing to 
lend to the banks for one period by depositing cash in exchange for longer-term claims.1 
Cr S depends positively on the interest rate since the public wants to save more money 
instead of spending it if the interest rate for savings is higher. The savers are paid at the 
beginning of the period with some of the initially created money in exchange for goods and 
services and lend the amount of money that they want to save to the private banks. Thus, this 
part of the originally created amount of money cannot be used for transactions during the 
period, and it is not included in the relevant amount of money. 
Private banks: The private banks lend to and borrow from the public. They have to borrow 
the amount that they are lending to the public from the central bank because they cannot 
create cash themselves. Further, they lend the amount that the public places with them to the 
central bank. The private banks set the interest rate on credit in a perfectly competitive 
environment, and their only costs are the interest payments for refinancing credit. There is no 
possibility of default. 
Central bank: The central bank undertakes refinancing operations with private banks at the 
beginning of a period. It gives any amount of credit to banks willing to pay a certain interest 
rate (full allotment). Each refinancing credit has to be paid back at the end of the period. The 
                                                          
1
 In the extended model outlined in Section 4, the credit supply function additionally includes deposits swapped 
into longer-term claims. 
5 
 
central bank’s task is to achieve an exogenous inflation target. It is assumed that some 
amount of money, M, causes the inflation rate to reach its target.2 Hence, the central bank 
achieves the target inflation rate by ensuring that this amount of money, M, circulates in the 
goods market.3 In general, a lower (higher) amount of money leads to an inflation rate below 
(above) the target. To achieve this task, the central bank sets the interest rate, i CB, that private 
banks must pay for refinancing credit and can obtain if they lend money to the central bank. 
The central bank has perfect information and foresight. 
The timing is as follows: 
(1) At the beginning of a period, the central bank sets the interest rate, i CB. 
(2) Directly after, the demanders of credit borrow the amount Cr D from the private banks 
and spend it. At the same time, the private banks borrow that amount from the central 
bank. 
(3) After some transactions, but still at the beginning of the period, the suppliers of credit 
lend the amount Cr S to the private banks. The private banks lend it to the central bank 
afterward. 
(4) During the period, the banks are closed, and the amount of money in circulation 
determines the inflation rate. 
                                                          
2
 The amount of money, M, can be derived from the previous period’s price level, the inflation target, the 
potential output, and the velocity of money at the potential output. For simplicity, it is assumed that M is 
constant. 
3
 The private banks’ claims against the central bank (reserves) are not included in the amount of money since 
they do not circulate in the goods market. 
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To solve the model, note that the assumptions about the private banking sector cause 
the market interest rate to equal i CB. Otherwise, banks would make losses or arbitrage 
opportunities would exist. 
What interest rate does the central bank set? If it set the market-clearing interest rate 
at which Cr D and Cr S are equal, all the money borrowed by the public at the beginning of 
the period would return to the banking sector immediately. No money would be available for 
transactions during the period, and prices would fall. For this reason, the central bank sets a 
lower interest rate. In particular, it sets the interest rate, i CB, such that the credit demand 
exceeds the credit supply by the preferred amount of money in circulation, M (Figure 1). This 
amount of money is the horizontal difference between Cr D and Cr S at i CB. This result does 
not imply that the credit market is in disequilibrium since the central bank creates and lends 
the amount of money to satisfy the credit demand not covered by the credit supply. 
Figure 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model explains how a different situation in the credit market changes the interest 
rate. Consider an economy in equilibrium in the previous period (period 0); in other words, 
the interest rate i 0CB caused the amount of money M—the horizontal difference between Cr 0S 
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and Cr D at interest rate i 0CB. Then, imagine, for example, that the credit supply increases 
because people want to save more at a given interest rate, all other things being equal. The 
Cr S curve shifts to the right from Cr 0S to Cr 1S (Figure 2). With an unchanged interest rate, 
this shift leads to a decline in the amount of money (to the horizontal difference between Cr 1S 
and Cr D at i 0CB). To keep the amount of money constant at quantity M, the central bank has 
to lower the interest rate from i 0CB to i 1CB. In this way, the new amount of money—the 
horizontal difference between Cr 1S and Cr D at interest rate i 1CB—is equal to the old amount 
of money. With a constant amount of money, the inflation target will be achieved. The shift 
results in an equilibrium with a lower interest rate and an increased amount of credit. 
Figure 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analogous to an increase in the credit supply, a decline in credit demand with no 
central bank intervention also reduces the amount of money and, hence, triggers an interest 
rate reduction by the central bank. In that case, however, the overall amount of credit 
declines. On the contrary, a decrease in the credit supply or an increase in the credit demand 
could potentially raise inflation through an increased amount of money, and therefore, it 
causes the central bank to raise the interest rate. 
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The model’s basic logic goes back to Wicksell (1907). He argues that if the banks 
kept the interest rate below a ‘normal’ level, there would be high inflation, whereas if they 
raised it above that level, there would be deflation. Therefore, to keep inflation in check, the 
interest rate has to be kept at its ‘normal’ level. 
Note that the model is formulated as a medium-term model that abstracts from the 
short-term adjustment process to the new equilibrium. Therefore, output is assumed to stay at 
its potential. Short-term changes in output and inflation, such as a temporary downturn with 
low inflation in the example of an increase in planned savings, are not modeled explicitly. 
Finally, note that central banks cannot observe any of the curves and cannot respond 
to them directly in practice. The assumption of perfect information is not crucial for the 
model’s conclusions, however. It is sufficient that the central bank has enough information to 
hit the inflation target in the medium term. This assumption is reasonable given the 
successful inflation targeting over recent decades. 
 
3. Comparison with Existing Theories 
This section outlines how the new model is related to three existing theories: loanable funds 
theory, endogenous money theory, and liquidity preference theory. 
 
Loanable Funds Theory 
Neoclassical loanable funds theory is the basis of many models in economics and is therefore 
of fundamental importance. In its basic version, it is assumed that the demand for 
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investments, I, depends negatively on the interest rate, i.4 This assumption is because more 
investment projects are profitable as the interest rate lowers. Further, the supply of savings, S, 
depends positively on the interest rate. The higher the interest rate is, the more people want to 
shift consumption to the future and consume less today. 
Both planned investments and planned savings meet in a market in which the 
equilibrium amount of investments, I*, and the equilibrium amount of savings, S*, are found 
by the equilibrium interest rate i*. 
This theory was derived from models without money. The idea was that savers lend 
goods to banks, which subsequently lend out those goods to investors. Since it is impossible 
to lend out more goods to investors than the amount offered by savers, the market interest 
rate has to equilibrate savings and investments.5 However, as mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper, that logic is not applicable to a monetary economy since banks can provide credit 
and create money without pre-existing deposits. 
Bibow (2001) and Lindner (2015), following this logic, both show that in a monetary 
economy, an increase in planned savings, for example, has an ambiguous effect on the 
interest rate through market mechanisms. They conclude that loanable funds theory must be 
abandoned. 
However, is there no way to reinterpret loanable funds theory to make it compatible 
with a monetary economy? After all, it is similar to the previously introduced model that 
                                                          
4
 For simplicity, there is no distinction between the nominal and real interest rates in this section. I assume, 
therefore, that the inflation target is zero. 
5
 In this model, the credit supplied by the banks is equal to the credit supplied by the public. 
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describes a monetary economy correctly. To show this similarity, loanable funds theory’s 
measures are introduced into the new model. 
Assume that all investments are financed with credit and that all credit finances 
investments. Then, investment demand is equal to credit demand—loanable funds theory’s I 
curve is identical to the new model’s Cr D curve. 
Introducing savings is slightly more difficult since there are two kinds of saving. First, 
there is ‘conscious’ saving when credit is provided to banks, as described by the Cr S curve. 
Second, there is ‘unconscious’ saving, namely, the possession of money. If a certain amount 
of money is being passed around every few days to pay for goods and services, everyone 
involved has been saving from the time he or she received the money until the time he or she 
purchased something with it. Hence, unconscious saving is equal to the amount of money in 
the economy because every coin or bank note is owned by someone who is unconsciously 
saving that amount for the time that he or she has it. The character of money as a means of 
saving is even clearer in the case of bank deposits. As bank deposits are used to conduct 
transactions, they are included in the amount of money; in addition, they bear interest—the 
reward for saving. 
To obtain the overall amount of savings, one has to add conscious and unconscious 
savings, namely, the credit supply and the amount of money. Loanable funds theory’s S curve 
is equal to the horizontal sum of the Cr S curve and the amount of money, M. Figure 3 shows 
the new model, including loanable funds theory’s measures. 
The interest rate that the central bank sets is equal to the interest rate that balances 
planned savings and planned investments. Hence, loanable funds theory’s central conclusion 
is valid in a monetary economy. 
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Figure 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the logic behind that balancing process is more complex than that suggested 
by loanable funds theory’s original interpretation. Market forces do not directly drive the 
interest rate toward the equilibrium. A change in planned savings or planned investments 
causes a deviation of the inflation rate from the target if the central bank does not adjust the 
interest rate. Hence, the central bank is forced to change the interest rate to the equilibrium 
level to achieve the inflation target. A rise in planned savings, for example, leads to an 
inflation rate below the target if the interest rate is not lowered. The central bank must 
therefore intervene, and there are more investments at a lower interest rate in the new 
equilibrium. 
To conclude, loanable funds theory can be reconciled with a monetary economy if one 
includes the presence of a central bank in the process of interest rate determination. This 
result means that the existence of a central bank that adjusts the interest rate to hit a given 
inflation target is a necessary condition for loanable funds theory to hold. The interpretation 
of loanable funds theory as a pure market theory, however, is flawed and must be discarded. 
As an addendum to this section, I discuss loanable funds theory’s most famous critic, 
J. M. Keynes, who once called it a ‘nonsense theory’ (1936, p. 179). Keynes insists that 
investments are not constrained by savings—his ‘most fundamental’ conclusion within the 
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field of interest theory (1937b, p. 669). The previous analysis shows that this conclusion is 
true only in a narrow sense. Yes, investments are not constrained directly by savings, as 
loanable funds theory’s original interpretation would suggest. However, investments are 
constrained by savings indirectly; a reduction in planned savings causes inflationary pressure, 
which makes the central bank raise the interest rate. A higher interest rate, in turn, reduces 
investments. 
 
Liquidity Preference Theory 
Liquidity preference theory was introduced in Keynes’ General Theory (1936) and 
labeled ‘radically opposed’ to loanable funds theory by Keynes (1937a,  p. 241) in his reply 
to Ohlin’s criticism (1937a, 1937b). It is argued that there is a trade-off between holding 
money and holding bonds. The advantage of money is that it can be used for transactions 
(i.e., that it is liquid). On the contrary, money does not bear interest. Bonds have the opposite 
properties; they bear interest but are not liquid. 
Therefore, the demand for money that the public wishes to hold—liquidity demand—
is a decreasing function of the interest rate on bonds. If the interest rate on bonds, which is 
the opportunity cost of holding money, rises, people want to lower the amounts of money in 
their portfolios and shift to bonds instead. In the equilibrium, the interest rate on bonds must 
take the value that balances demand for liquidity and the money supply set by the central 
bank. In other words, Keynes interpreted the interest rate as a liquidity premium. 
As Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003, pp. 11ff.) show, this view is not accurate for the 
monetary systems of modern economies. Today, shares of interest-bearing government bonds 
can be used to conduct transactions, implying that they are perfectly liquid and can be 
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regarded as ‘money.’ Therefore, the trade-off between having either an interest-bearing bond 
or money no longer exists. Hence, it cannot be the determinant of the interest rate on liquid 
bonds.6 The previously introduced model also shows that other factors determine the interest 
rate. That the interest rate is not a trade-off between having a liquid asset and receiving 
interest becomes even clearer in the extension of the model in Section 4 with the existence of 
interest-bearing deposits. This result does not mean that liquidity premia do not exist for 
certain assets. However, as a theory to determine the interest rate (i.e., the overall level of 
interest rates), liquidity preference theory is not useful.7 
 
Endogenous Money Theory 
Endogenous money theory is a post-Keynesian monetary theory with two specifications: the 
original ‘horizontalist’ approach and more advanced ‘structuralist’ approach. For simplicity, 
the horizontalist approach, supported by Moore (1988) and Lavoie (1984, 1996, 2006), is 
described and compared with the new model. The derived conclusions apply equally to the 
structuralist approach. 
                                                          
6
 Of course, there still exist illiquid bonds with liquidity premia. However, central banks generally conduct 
monetary policy through the interest rate on highly liquid bonds (e.g., T-bills) and therefore leave liquidity 
premia unchanged. 
7
 In contrast to this view, there have been several attempts to reconcile liquidity preference theory with loanable 
funds theory, such as those of Ohlin, Robertson, and Hawtrey (1937), Robertson (1938), Lerner (1938), Fellner 
and Somers (1941), Johnson (1951), Tsiang (1956, 1980), Ackley (1957), Patinkin (1958), Foley (1975), and 
Snippe (1985). However, none of these analyses uses a reasonable model of a modern monetary system with 
endogenous money. 
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It is assumed that the credit demand of the public, Cr D, depends negatively on the 
interest rate, as before. Further, the credit supply function is defined in the usual way, 
namely, as the amount of credit that the banks are willing to grant at a given interest rate. 
This amount is denoted by Cr S* (in contrast to the fundamentally different credit supply by 
the public, Cr S). The credit supply is perfectly elastic at an interest rate that exceeds the 
central bank rate by an exogenous mark-up, m. 
The intersection of Cr D and Cr S* defines the credit market equilibrium, which is the 
equilibrium interest rate and equilibrium amount of credit. The amount of credit is equal to 
the amount of money (net of reserves). This amount is denoted by M*, in contrast to the new 
model’s amount of money, M. 
In many respects, the horizontalist model is similar to the new model. They both 
stress the crucial role of bank credit in money creation and, thus, the endogenous nature of 
money; they incorporate the fact that bank credit creates deposits rather than vice versa; and 
they illustrate the insight that investments are necessary for people to be able to save.8 
Nevertheless, there are differences. The new model incorporates no interest rate mark-
up since it is assumed that (1) no costs are associated with banking, (2) there are no default 
risks, and (3) the banking sector is perfectly competitive. Relaxing any of these assumptions 
leads to a lending rate above the central bank rate and, hence, a mark-up. Thus, it is a useful 
extension to the new model to introduce a mark-up, m, that the banks charge on top of the 
                                                          
8
 Another popular approach that stresses these facts is so-called modern monetary theory. As Palley (2015) 
shows, however, that set of ideas is overly simplistic and neglects some of the important problems faced by 
monetary economies, such as controlling inflation. 
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central bank rate for providing credit. The public can borrow at a rate of i CB + m from the 
banks and can lend to the banks at an interest rate of i CB. 
Figure 4 depicts the new model with a mark-up. Further, the horizontalist model’s 
curves are plotted (similar to the first quadrant in Palley 2013, p. 12). The central difference 
between the two models is that in the horizontalist model, the amount of money, M*, is equal 
to the full demand for credit. In the new model, instead, the amount of money, M, is equal to 
the credit demand minus the amount that the public transforms into longer-term claims. 
Figure 4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since longer-term claims against banks cannot be used to conduct transactions, they 
should not be included in the amount of money. Therefore, the horizontalist model misses a 
central point of the nature of money; the amount of money is not equal to the full amount of 
originally created money but rather to the difference between money created and money 
destroyed. 
To conclude, post-Keynesian endogenous money models are a good starting point for 
modeling a modern monetary system. It is, however, necessary to include the fact that money 
is not only created but also destroyed. 
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4. Introduction of a Modern Monetary System 
The basic model already captured two of the initially mentioned facts about monetary 
systems that are misrepresented frequently: banks create new money by lending and the 
central bank does not set the amount of money—it sets the interest rate. To show that the 
other facts can also be incorporated into the framework without altering the model’s insights, 
a more detailed monetary system is now introduced. 
For that reason, the assumption that all money is cash is relaxed. From now on, only 
the share, c, of the money in circulation is cash, with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. The other share, 1 – c, is bank 
deposits bearing interest. The private banks create money by providing credit to the public. 
Further, there is a minimum reserve requirement for the deposits that banks have during the 
period; each private bank has to lend an amount θ times the deposits it receives to the central 
bank, with 0 < θ ≤ 1. The central bank pays the interest rate, i CB, for the minimum reserve. 
The new timing illustrates how the extensions affect the model: 
(1) At the beginning of the period, the central bank sets the interest rate, i CB, on base 
money, which it can create. 
(2) The amount Cr D is created by the banking sector and lent out to the public. The 
private banks have to borrow the amount of demanded cash, c M, from the central 
bank since only the central bank can create cash. The remaining amount, Cr D – c M, 
is created as deposits by the private banks themselves in the process of providing 
credit. 
(3) Also at the beginning of the period, the public uses the amount Cr S to provide credit 
to the private banks. Therefore, cash is placed with the private banks, and deposits are 
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swapped into longer-term claims with lending terms of one period.9 Longer-term 
claims are not considered to be money. The remaining amount of deposits, (1 – c) M, 
is used to conduct transactions during the period. The private banks’ minimum 
reserve requirement becomes θ (1 – c) M, which they have to borrow from the central 
bank in addition to the amount of cash, c M. The banks lend the necessary minimum 
reserve to the central bank. 
(4) During the period, the inflation rate is determined by the amount of money in 
circulation, M, consisting of the amount of cash, c M, that circulates physically and 
the amount of deposits, (1 – c) M, that circulates from one account to another. 
This setup incorporates the remaining facts about the monetary system that contradict 
the view offered in standard undergraduate textbooks, such as that of Blanchard and Illing 
(2009, pp. 130-139). Banks do not ‘multiply up’ the amount of base money into the amount 
of broad money. Instead, the amount of broad money is determined first and affects the 
amount of base money. Therefore, broad money creation is not limited by the amount of base 
money. Lastly, deposits are not necessary for banks to provide credit. Deposits are created 
during the act of providing credit. 
In the following, it is shown that the process of interest rate determination in this 
setup is similar to that in the previous section. Therefore, it is argued that the equilibrium 
interest rate for credit and deposits is equal to the interest rate that the central bank sets. 
First, consider the market for deposits. If the market interest rate for deposits is lower 
than i CB, it is profitable for a bank to pay a little more than the market interest rate on 
                                                          
9
 It is assumed that the savers choose the longer-term claim over deposits if the interest rate is the same for both 
assets. 
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deposits. In that way, the bank could attract deposits from other banks, which have to 
compensate it for the shift of deposits with base money. Since banks receive i CB when they 
provide base money to the market, the bank could make a profit. Every other bank would also 
have that incentive; hence, the interest rate on the market for deposits rises if it is lower than 
i CB. However, it is not profitable for the banks to raise the interest rate for deposits above i CB 
because they can obtain base money from the central bank at that interest rate. Therefore, the 
interest rate for deposits is i CB in equilibrium. The same logic applies to the interest rate that 
banks charge for credit since the banks can try to attract credit instead of deposits. Hence, the 
market interest rate for credit from the public is also i CB in the equilibrium. Since the banks 
have capital costs of i CB when they provide credit, they cannot lend for less than i CB. They 
also cannot charge more since perfect competition drives down the interest rate for credit lent 
by the banks to i CB. To sum up, the central bank rate determines all market interest rates 
perfectly. 
The adjustment mechanism is analogous to the one described in Section 2. Take again 
an increase in the credit supply (see Figure 2).10 With an unchanged central bank rate i 0CB, an 
amount of deposits Cr D is created by the private banks at the beginning of period 1 by 
serving credit demand as in period 0; however, an increased amount Cr 1S of initially created 
deposits is swapped into longer-term claims. This process might reduce the amount of money 
to the horizontal difference between Cr 1S and Cr D at i 0CB and cause below-target inflation. 
Therefore, the central bank sets a lower interest rate in period 1, which has the following 
effects. A lower interest rate on base money lowers the private banks’ capital costs. 
Therefore, they are willing to provide credit at a lower interest rate. At a lower interest rate, 
                                                          
10
 For simplicity, the adjustment process is described for the case without cash (c = 0). 
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more credit is demanded by the public, and, thus, more money is created by the private banks. 
In addition, the credit supply declines as the interest rate lowers. The credit supply is the 
amount of the initially created money transformed into longer-term claims and, hence, 
‘destroyed.’ Owing to these two effects of a reduced central bank rate, the amount of money 
in circulation and, hence, inflation can be kept constant. Specifically, the central bank lowers 
the interest rate to i 1CB in Figure 2. To round off this section, Table 1 presents the aggregate 
balance sheets during the period. 
 
Table 1) 
Assets Central bank Liabilities 
 
Refinancing credit [c + θ (1 – c)] M Reserves θ (1 – c) M 
  
Cash c M 
 
 
Assets Private banks Liabilities 
 
Credit to the public Cr D Refinancing credit [c + θ (1 – c)] M 
Reserves θ (1 – c) M Credit from the public Cr S 
  Deposits 
 
(1 – c) M 
 
Assets The public Liabilities 
 
Credit to the banks Cr S Credit from the banks Cr D 
Deposits (1 – c) M   
Cash c M  
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5. Conclusions 
It is important to formulate an interest theory that incorporates the insights about the 
monetary system pointed out by the Bank of England and Bundesbank. This paper introduces 
a suitable model. Its novelty is to include a credit supply function by the public that measures 
the public’s planned savings for any interest rate. This measure represents the amount of 
money ‘destroyed’ by being swapped into longer-term claims. Further, the interest rate 
determination process in the model includes decisions by the central bank. The model thus 
shows that the credit supply and the credit demand determine the interest rate indirectly. 
Shifts in either the credit supply or the credit demand would change inflation. The central 
bank adjusts the interest rate to offset these changes. 
The model’s insights are the missing piece to reconcile loanable funds theory’s view 
that the interest rate balances planned investments and planned savings with a correct 
understanding of monetary economies. This reconciliation is only possible, however, if one 
accepts that the balancing process is not a simple market mechanism but includes a central 
bank that adjusts the interest rate endogenously to hit an inflation target. 
Although endogenous money theory describes the monetary system correctly in 
principle, it does not consider the fact that money is not only created but also destroyed. The 
introduction of an alternative credit supply function, as presented in this paper, would 
therefore enhance this approach. Liquidity preference theory is not useful for explaining the 
level of interest rates in a modern monetary economy, as previously shown by Stiglitz and 
Greenwald (2003). 
A straightforward policy conclusion of this paper is that there is no mechanism for 
austerity (i.e., reducing credit demand through lower budget deficits) to increase private 
investment when interest rates are at their lower bound. Similarly, expansionary fiscal policy 
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does not crowd out private investment when interest rates are at their lower bound. In normal 
times, however, expansionary fiscal policy does crowd out private investments, not because 
the additional government debt absorbs ‘savings funds’ that would have been available for 
financing private investments, but rather because increased budget deficits trigger interest 
rate increases by the central bank. Higher interest rates then depress private investment. 
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